Despite the necessity of protecting information stored in database systems DBS, existing security models are insu cient to prevent misuse, especially insider abuse by legitimate users. Further, concepts for misuse detection in DBS have not been adequately addressed by existing research in misuse detection. Even though there are available means to guard the information stored in the database system against misuse, they are seldom used by security o cers because security policies of the organization are either imprecise or not known at all. This paper presents a misuse detection system called DEMIDS which is tailored to relational database systems. DEMIDS uses audit logs to derive pro les that describe typical behavior of users working with the DBS. The pro les computed can beused to detect misuse behavior, in particular insider abuse. Furthermore, the pro les can serve as a valuable tool for security re-engineering of an organization by helping the security o cers to de ne re ne security policies and to verify existing security policies, if there are any.
Motivation
In today's business world, information is the most valuable asset of organizations and thus requires appropriate management and protection. In this, database systems play a center role because they not only allow the e cient management and retrieval of huge amounts of data, but also because they provide mechanisms that can be employed to ensure the integrity of the stored data.
1 Reality, however, shows that such mechanisms for enforcing organizational security policies are often not adequately used. There are various reasons for this. First, security policies are often not known or not well speci ed, making it di cult or even impossible to translate them into appropriate security mechanisms. This observation holds for both general security policies as well as policies tailored to individual database users and applications. Second, and more importantly, security policies do not su ciently guard data stored in a database system against privileged users". For example, CK96 has revealed that in computer systems the primary security threat comes from insider abuse rather than from intrusion. This observation results in the fact that much more emphasis has to be placed on internal control mechanisms of systems, such as audit log analysis. Security models as described in, e.g., WSF79, Den86, JS90, SW92 , to prevent misuse 1 are insu cient to protect the information stored in database systems because of the increase in the size of data to achieve a ne grain control. More importantly, these models assume that security policies of an organization are known, which, as mentioned before, is often not the case. Misuse detection systems MDSs 2 are a cost-e ective compromise to establish and assure a certain degree of security in a system. Nevertheless, concepts for misuse detection in database systems have not been adequately addressed by existing MDSs which neither consider the structure and semantics nor the ne granularity of data in database systems. In this paper we propose a misuse detection system tailored to relational database systems. The system called DEMIDS DEtection of MI suse in Database Systems provides a rich set of tools to derive user pro les from audit logs. Such pro les describe the typical behavior access patterns of users in the system by specifying the typical values of features that are audited in audit logs. The pro les derived are used to detect misuse behavior. Although it can be used to detect both intrusion and insider abuse, DEMIDS places emphasis on the detection of malicious behavior by legitimate users who abuse their privileges. Hence the systems is particularly useful for internal control. Our system can complement misuse detection at the operating system layer because intrusion attempts that MDSs fail to detect at the operating system layer may b e detected as anomalous events at the database system layer. Further, the pro les derived can serve as a valuable tool for security re-engineering of an organization by helping the security o cer SSO to de ne re ne security policies and to verify existing security policies, if there are any. Finally, pro les can be used to implement respective enforcing mechanisms in the database systems using, e.g., triggers, assignment of privileges, or roles. Essential to the proposed approach is that, given a database schema and associated applications, the access patterns of users will form some working scopes comprising certain sets of attributes that are usually referenced together with some values. The idea of working scopes is nicely captured by the concept of frequent itemsets which are sets of features with certain values. Based on the data structure and semantics integrity constraints encoded in the data dictionary and the user behavior re ected in the audit logs, DEMIDS de nes a notion of distance m e asure which measures the closeness of a set of attributes with respect to the working scopes. Distance measures are used to guide the search for frequent itemsets in the audit logs by a novel data mining approach that takes advantage of the e cient data processing functionality of database management systems. Misuse, such as tampering with the integrity of data, then can be detected by comparing the derived pro les against the security policies speci ed or against new information audit data gathered about the users.
Related Work
The security goals of database systems are availability, con dentiality and integrity CFMS95 . Mandatory and discretionary access control models have been proposed for general computer systems to achieve these goals BLP73, Bib77, Dio81, H R U76 . Nevertheless, these mechanisms typically operate on the le and command process level of operating systems, which is too coarse for the ner level of granularity o f data in database systems. There are various extensions of these security models to database systems. Den86, JS90, SW92 extend the concept of mandatory access control in relational database systems by allowing polyinstantiation of data at the tuple level. WSF79 provides a mapping between access control in a DBS to that at operating system level. These mechanisms are fundamentally the same as general mandatory access control models and hence su er the same limitation of being only applicable to an organization with known security policies. Further, polyinstantiations come at the cost of increasing the numberof tuples in the database. Detection mechanisms are employed to complement the shortcomings of prevention mechanisms JV91, VL89, HDL + 90, SCCC + 96, FHSL96, LS98 . Nevertheless, concepts for misuse detection in database systems have not been adequately addressed by existing misuse detection systems. These systems typically reside on the operating system and or network which work with les and system commands. The mapping between les in operating systems to relations and attributes in database systems is not exact and hence cannot closely re ect the user behavior. Moreover, auditing the user behavior at these layers is unsuited for misuse detection at the DBS level because the semantics and structure of the data are not re ected in such audit logs. Unlike previous MDSs, such domain knowledge is considered by DEMIDS to derive user pro les.
Terminology
In the rest of the paper we adopt the relational database model as the underlying data model for DEMIDS. We assume a given database schema S = hR; I C iwhere R is a set of relation schemas and I Cis a set of integrity constraints that have to besatis ed by every instance of the database schema. A relation schema R 2 R is denoted by R = hA 1 ; :::; A n i where each A i is an attribute. We denote the attributes associated with a relation schema R 2 R by attrR, and the attributes contained in the whole schema S by attrS. The value of attribute A i of tuple t from an instance of a relation schema R is denoted by t:A i The integrity constraints considered in this paper include primary and foreign key constraints imposed on relations in R. We furthermore assume that associated with the database is a set of applications. A database application is considered to be a sequence of parameterized SQL queries. Users interact with the database system through a set of operations which are either issued by applications on behalf of the users, or directly by users in form of free form database modi cations as they are typically issued by, e.g., database administrators.
Organization of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we discuss the architecture of DEMIDS, in particular its coupling with a given database system. In Section 3, we introduce the notions of distance measure and frequent itemsets to capture the working scopes of users. In Section 4, we present a novel data mining algorithm to discover pro les for users based on the idea of distance measure and frequent itemsets. In Section 5, the advantages of the Pro ler are discussed and its application to some scenarios is given. We conclude the paper in Section 6 with a summary and overview of future research.
Architecture
The proposed misuse detection system DEMIDS is tightly coupled to an existing database system in that DEMIDS utilizes certain functionality of the system such as auditing and query processing. DEMIDS consists of four components The Auditor is responsible for collecting the audit data of users by auditing their queries through the auditing functionality of the DBMS. A set of interesting features to audit is selected by the security o cer SSO, depending on the security policy to establish or verify. For example, if a security policy states that access to a set of sensitive attributes should bemonitored, an interesting feature would be the set of attributes names referenced in the queries. If fabrication of data is the concern, new and old values of attributes in update and insert queries should be audited. In general, we do not assume scenarios where everything" is audited. The features that have to beaudited are selected by the SSO. In practice, features are selected depending on whether the behavior and access patterns of particular users are of interest or whether the usage of certain applications by certain users is of interest. Monitored features are recorded in audit logs. In order for the auditing and log management not to become a bottleneck of the database system and associated applications, it is possible to periodically purge audit logs to another database system which then is also used by the other components of DEMIDS. The Data Processor is responsible for preprocessing the raw data in the audit logs, such as the handling of missing values, converting the raw data into appropriate data structures and types for the Pro ler. More importantly, it groups the raw audit data into audit sessions. This is a critical step because the way audit data are aggregated into audit sessions determines what pro les are generated. For instance, the data can be grouped according to users or roles adopted by the users SCFY96 . 3 User pro les are generated in the former case and role pro les in the latter. During the training stage, which is typically supervised by the SSO, the Pro ler generates a pro le for each audit session. The Pro ler consults the repository of domain knowledge, such as the database schema, to guide its search for pro les that satisfy certain interesting measures, for example, a su cient support. It is assumed that during the training stage, users do not perform malicious behavior to train the Pro ler and that there are enough data collected to represent their typical behavior. For instance, in an o ce system, the training stage can include o ce hours during weekdays since most business operations are performed during o ce hours of weekdays and the rst and last few days of a month to cover monthly operations. In systems where users have well de ned job descriptions, user behavior is fairly stable and the training stage can last for a shorter period of time, for instance, only a few days. During the monitoring stage, the Detector computes a score to determine if user activities are suspicious. This can be achieved by comparing the new information audit records about user activities against the corresponding pro les derived during the training stage. Another way is to compare the user pro les against the security policy. Both the pro les and security policies in DEMIDS are speci ed in a rule based format. Comparison of the pro les and policies can bebased on the numberof new rules, missing rules and rules with the same precondition but di erent consequents.
3 Approach
In this section, we describe the main idea behind the concept of working scopes for users. We then de ne the notion of distance measure to capture the degree of closeness" of a set of attributes in a given database schema with respect to the working scopes. This is followed by a description of the concept of frequent itemsets which employs distance measures to represent the working scopes of users. The idea of frequent itemsets forms the basis for deriving user pro les.
Working Scopes
We conjecture that a user typically will not access all attributes and data in a schema and databases respectively. Attributes used in a query are related through primary and foreign key dependencies among the relations in a schema using join conditions. Therefore, the access patterns of users will form some working scopes which are sets of attributes that are usually referenced together with some values. A pro le captures the idea of working scopes by specifying the typical values of sets of features in an audit session.
Example 3.1 We use the sample database schema shown in Figure 2 as an example. This database schema can easily be derived from the information recorded in the data dictionary. Let the set of features in audit sessions bethe type of the query operation queryType, the sets of attributes referenced by the query R:A = 1 if attribute A from relation R is referenced, 0 otherwise, the relation referenced by the insert query relation, the values of attributes R 
Distance Measure
Working scopes of users consist of attributes that are closely related in the database schema and are often referenced together in database modi cation statements which, of course, can include data retrieval statements. To capture the idea of closeness" of attributes in a database schema, we introduce the notion of distance measure. Our notion of distance measure is used to guide the Pro ler in discovering pro les from audit sessions.
Considering a given database schema S, attributes are structurally close if they either belong to the same relation or can berelated by exploiting a sequence of foreign key dependencies. This aspect is re ected by the schema distance function.
De nition 3.2 Schema Distance Function Assume a database schema S with a set R of relation schemas. Given two attributes A i 2 R;A j 2 S where R;S 2 R, the pairwise schema distance between A i and A j , denoted by PSDistA i ; A j , is de ned as PSDistA i ; A j : = ShortestDistR;S maxfShortestDistR k ; R l j R k ; R l 2 R g Given a set of attributes fA 1 ; : : : ; A n g attrS, the schema distance function is de ned as SchemaDistA 1 ; : : : ; A n := maxfP SDistA i ; A j g where ShortestDistR;S computes the shortest distance between two relations R and S in the database schema based on primary and foreign keys by which R and S can be related.
We normalize the distance measure by the maximum shortest distance between any pair R k ; R l of relations in the database schema so that the value of distance measure falls in the range of 0 to 1. The nearer the value of the distance measure to 1, the closer is the set of attributes. Although two attributes are schematically close, this does not necessarily mean that they are semantically close, too. Since we w ould like to derive a pro le for each audit session, the access patterns of the attributes in audit sessions should be considered in the distance measure as well. In order to capture this aspect, we de ne an access a nity function which considers the dynamic access patterns on the attributes.
De nition 3.3 Access A nity Function Given a set A = fA 1 ; : : : ; A n g attrS of attributes contained in a database schema S. SWeight is a value that has to bespeci ed by the SSO prior to the auditing and is used to weigh the schema distance component. The higher the value for SWeight, the more important is the schematic property in computing the distance measure, and vice versa. If users often access attributes of relations that are related by some foreign key dependencies, then SWeight can beset to a higher value. The distance measure of S 1 is very small because the attributes are closely related in the database schema and are often referenced together in the queries. The distance measure for S 2 is larger because the attributes are not only further apart in the database schema, but also not referenced together in the queries.
Since S 1 has a smaller distance measure, features referencing this set of attributes would likely fall into the same working scopes. Similarly, since S 2 has a greater distance measure, features referencing this set of random attributes would not beconsidered to bein the same working scope.
Frequent Itemsets
We use the concept of frequent itemsets to describe the working scopes of users. A frequent itemset is a set of features with values assigned to them. The set of features is selected by the SSO. For instance, the timestamp of audit records is an interesting feature if we are interested in the temporal aspect of user behavior. The sets of attributes referenced by the queries are interesting too, especially if they belong to relations that are sensitive. The working scopes of users are sets of attributes that are often referenced together with certain typical values. Therefore, sets of feature value pairs can nicely represent the working scopes of users. It should be mentioned that frequent itemsets are a better representation for working scopes than clusters since objects in clusters are not tagged with values. Furthermore, it is more appropriate to use frequent itemsets to describe working scopes than to use association rules AS94 since there is no causal relationship in the access of attributes in queries. Although the pro les for frequent itemsets are transformed to rules by the predicate describing the audit session, the working scopes of users are represented by sets of feature value pairs. Frequent itemsets that are subsets of other frequent itemsets represent the same working scopes. Therefore, we are interested in discovering minimal frequent itemsets that cover smaller frequent itemsets.
De nition 3.7 Minimal Frequent Itemset Given a set I = fI 1 ; : : : ; I n g of frequent itemsets in an audit session AuditS. A frequent itemset I 2 I is a minimal frequent itemset in AuditS if there is no other frequent itemset I 0 2 I such that I I 0 . Example 3.8 Suppose we have a set of frequent itemsets I=fI ; I 0 g for audit session AuditS where I = fqueryType='select', t.amount=1, t.creditSID=1 g I 0 = fqueryType='select', t.amount=1, t.creditSID=1, t.debitSID=1, c.custName=1 g. I is not a minimal frequent itemset in I for AuditS because I 0 is a superset of I. I 0 is a minimal frequent itemset in I for AuditS.
Frequent itemsets are evaluated by some interesting measures, such as minimality. It is important that all frequent itemsets satisfying this measure are discovered. Therefore, we introduce the notion of completeness.
De nition 3.9 Completeness A set of frequent itemsets I is complete in an audit session AuditS if I contains all minimal frequent itemset in AuditS.
We described our conjecture on the access patterns of users which form some working scopes, and discussed how we can represent these working scopes by distance measures and frequent itemsets. We have also introduced the notion of minimality and completeness to evaluate the frequent itemsets discovered by the Pro ler. In the next section, a data mining algorithm to discover all minimal frequent itemsets from audit logs is presented.
Frequent Itemsets Pro ler
In this section, we present a data mining algorithm for the Frequent Itemset Pro ler to discover the frequent itemsets from an audit session. The algorithm is tightly integrated with the database system by storing the data in tables and by using SQL queries to take advantage of the query processing capabilities of the DBMS. We rst describe the data structures and input to the Pro ler before presenting the algorithm. We establish several criteria for an evaluation of a Pro ler and show that those criteria are satis ed by the proposed Pro ler.
Data Structures
We assume that data about audit sessions are stored in a table called Session = hTID; feature; fvaluei. Each audit record is assigned a unique T I D . feature and fvalue store the feature value pair of an audit record.
We use the tables F = hF I I D ; A ; A V a l i and FMaster = hFIID; sup; disti to store the itemsets.
Each itemset is assigned a unique FIID. A; AV al correspond to the feature value pair of an itemset. sup; dist are the support and distance measure of the itemsets. We use a separate table FMaster to store the support and distance measure of itemsets because it is not desirable to repeat them for each item in an itemset.
The table L k = hsup; A 1 ; A 1 : V a l ; : : : ; A k ; A k :V ali stores the itemsets fA 1 = A 1 : V a l ; : : : ; A k = A k :V alg with support supThreshold. Tables L 1 ; : : : ; L n where n is the total number of attributes in the database schema are used to discover all itemsets with a su cient support. As described later, L k is derived from L k,1 and hence we only need to use two tables. However, this method is not described in the algorithm for the sake of clear illustration.
Example 4.1 Table Session stores audit records: queryType='select', t.TID=1, t.amount=1, t.debitSID=1, t.creditSID=0 with TID=1 queryType='select', t.TID=1, t.amount=0, t.debitSID=0, t.creditSID=1 with TID=2 Tables F and FMaster store itemsets: fqueryType='select', t.TID=1, t.amount=1, t.debitSID=1g 100, 0.1 , fqueryType='select', c.income.Val='high', cc.CCID=1g 50, 0.2 In the current prototype of DEMIDS, we use the Oracle8 server Ora97 as our underlying DBMS to store and process the audit data.
Algorithm
The algorithm to discover all minimal frequent itemsets in an audit session is divided into four steps:
Step 1: Derive tables L 1 ; : : : ; L n where n is the total number of attributes in the database schema. Insert all itemsets in L 1 ; : : : ; L n into F.
Step 2: Compute distance measure for itemsets in F. Store them in FMaster
Step 3: Prune frequent itemsets in F with distance measure distThreshold.
Step 4: Prune non-minimal frequent itemsets in F. Update FMaster accordingly.
Step 1 Initialization F; FMaster ; for k=1;k n; k++ Step 3
Delete itemsets that are not frequent itemsets delete from F where FIID not in select FIID from FMaster
Step 4
Delete itemsets in F that are subset of others delete from F where FIID = any The set of itemsets discovered is complete in the audit session because, as aforementioned, all candidate itemsets with high enough support are inserted into F in Step 1, and an itemset is deleted from F only if it is not a frequent itemset
Step 3 or if it is not minimal Step 4.
14 5 Discussion
Comparison
Our Frequent Itemsets Pro ler is a novel approach for deriving user pro les. AS94 proposed the concept of association rules to represent pro les of users. Algorithms based on association rules attempt to discover the causal relationships among items in transactions which, in our case would be audit sessions. However, association rules are inappropriate to represent the working scopes of users in database systems because there is no such causal relationship in the access patterns of attributes in a query. Post-processing is necessary to prune those association rules that represent the same working scope. Unlike association rules algorithms, our Frequent Itemsets Pro ler avoids discovering redundant rules that represent the same working scopes since frequent itemsets are sets of feature value pairs. Another related approach, the clustering approach Eve73 , discovers sets of objects, so-called clusters, that are close under a certain distance measure. However, the set of objects discovered are not tagged with values and hence clusters cannot represent typical values of features in working scopes. In addition, most clustering algorithms are not scalable to the size of the data. Unlike clustering algorithms, our Frequent Itemsets Pro ler discovers frequent itemsets by using the data processing capability of the DBMS and hence is scalable to the size of audit data. The algorithm to discover frequent itemsets exhibits similar features as hierarchical clustering algorithm, which is illustrated by Corollary 4.4. Hierarchical clustering algorithms continuously merge smaller sets of objects into larger clusters step by step. Our algorithm takes advantage of the data processing power of DBMS by pruning non-minimal frequent itemsets in one delete query. More importantly, we use the notion of distance measure to capture the domain knowledge encoded in a database schema, and to guide the search of interesting frequent itemsets. Since consecutive queries may correspond to similar tasks, they can be aggregated together. For example, consecutive audit records of the same query type within a certain time window can beaggregated into one audit record. The notion of distance measure then would beuseful in identifying sets of attributes that correspond to the working scopes of users for these queries.
Scenarios
Here we give t wo scenarios to illustrate the e ectiveness of our Frequent Itemsets Pro ler. We use the example described in Section 3. This change of interest of Teller at the schema level is illustrated by the di erence between the set of attributes occuring in the frequent itemset I Misuse1 and that in I Normal . It is worth mentioning that supThreshold can be set to a higher level during the training stage so that only frequent itemsets corresponding to typical user behavior are discovered. In case user Teller only issues the misuse query infrequently and the detection of such abuse is required, the threshold can belowered during the monitoring stage to detect those infrequent queries. Mismatch of this outliner behavior against the typical behavior detected by the Detector can trigger alarm to the SSO. 
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we have presented the concepts and architecture underlying DEMIDS, a misuse detection system for relational database systems. DEMIDS provides security o cers a means to derive user pro les from audit logs recording various features of accesses to the databases system through users and applications. The derived user pro les describe the typical user behavior in terms of typical access patterns against certain information structures relations, attributes, and data of a database. Derived pro les provide a security o cer with a means not only to verify re ne existing security policies, but also to establish security policies as part of the security re-engineering of a given database system. In particular, DEMIDS considers the data structure and semantics speci ed in the database schema through the notion of distance measure. Such domain knowledge is used to guide the Frequent Itemsets Pro ler to search for frequent itemsets which can e ectively represent the working scopes of users. Our Frequent Itemsets Pro ler is capable of discovering all those minimal frequent itemsets in audit sessions by taking advantage of the query processing power of the DBMS. We h a ve illustrated the e ectiveness of our Frequent Itemsets Pro ler in detecting misuse by several scenarios.
We h a ve conducted an evaluation of our Frequent Itemsets Pro ler based on synthesized data. We are in the process of acquiring medical and nancial data as well as underlying database schemas and associated applications to conduct further analysis and would like to conduct analytical analysis on the performance of the Pro ler. E ectiveness of the Detector can be evaluated by asking a user knowing the security policies to attempt to defeat the system by acquiring a treasure buried in the database. One of our future research directions is to investigate other means to de ne the notion of distance measure, such as de ning distance measures among attribute values, and using a di erent formulation other than the linear relationships encoded in foreign key dependencies. We are also interested in considering other domain knowledge to guide the discovery of pro les. Groups of values for features can be replaced by some other values of higher level of abstraction. For instance, scores of range 10-20, 20-50, 50-90, 90-100 can bereplaced by 'very low', 'low', 'high', 'very high' respectively. Introducing a certain degree of imprecision to the feature values helps to reveal regularities in the data. Such classi cation can beobtained from the SSO, or can bederived by considering the statistical distribution of feature values in an audit session. Another interesting research issue is to derive pro les for roles. A user may perform di erent and unrelated tasks during his her interaction with the database system, but roles are more closely tied to the functions or tasks performed. Role pro les may give rise to more regular patterns than user pro les since functions or tasks operate on data that are related and there is a more static set of sequences of operations. The challenge is to identify portions of the audit data that correspond to the same role. If the roles are not known to the SSO but users execute scripts on a regular basis to perform routine tasks, the scripts would serve to identify the roles the users take. In case that the user interacts with the database system through some application such as forms and reports, these applications perform well-de ned database modi cations on behalf of the user, and thus can bethe basic units to identify the roles.
